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Stallion Syndicates as Securities
By RUTHEFORD B CAMPBELL, JR.*
INTRODUCTION"
To people outside the horse business, the word "syndicate"
may conjure up images of sinister characters and organized
crime. People who invest in horses, however, attach quite a dif-
ferent meaning to the word syndicates. Mention of a syndicate
may remind them of Secretariat, Niatross, *Aladdinnl or Easy
Jet, depending upon the particular breed of horse that interests
them. They also think of something else: money, big money.2
Although one cannot seriously contend that syndicates alone
are responsible for the spectacular monetary growth of the horse
business, 3 they certainly have facilitated that growth. Syndicates
have been and continue to be the principal vehicle for multiple
ownership of expensive stallions of the major breeds and have en-
abled "smaller" investors to own an interest in stallions, which
' Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. A.B. 1966, Centre College; J.D. 1969,
University of Kentucky; LL.M. 1971, Harvard. The author wishes to express his apprecia-
tion to Kathryn Parrish Ross for her assistance in the preparation of this Article.
"" This Article is dedicated to Gayle A. Mohney (1906-1980). He was a decent and
generous man whose contributions to the horse industry were enormous.
1 An asterisk indicates the horse is not American-bred.2 Examples of large syndicates are: Conquistador Cielo (thoroughbred) syndicated
in 1982 at a value of $36 million, THE HORSEMAN'S J., Oct. 1982 at 5; Niatross (standard-
bred) syndicated in 1980 at a value of $9.5 million, telephone interview with Louis P.
Guida (Sept. 14, 1982); *Aladdinn (Arabian) syndicated in 1979 at a value of $6.3 million,
SKY, June 1982, at 102; Easy Jet (quarter horse) syndicated in 1980 at a value of $30 mil-
lion, telephone interview with Ken Carson. THOROUGHBRED REc. (Sept. 14, 1982). The
foregoing values are approximate, and in some of the examples less than 100 % of the horse
was syndicated or sold. For example, only a 50% interest in Niatross was syndicated for
$4.75 million. That particular syndication occurred prior to the retirement of the horse
from the track.
3 The average prices paid for yearlings at the Keeneland Summer Sales over the past
few years are as follows:
1978 $121,654
1979 $155,567
1980 $196,863
1981 $250,113
1982 $337,734.
Telephone interview with Linda MeDaniels, Keeneland Sales Office (Sept. 15,1982).
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otherwise would be well beyond their means. This additional de-
mand has to some extent helped to establish and maintain the
existing price levels for top quality horses.
I. THE TERMS OF A STALLION SYNDICATE
The terms and conditions of stallion syndicates may vary but
one generally will find substantial uniformity among the various
stallion syndicate agreements. At the most basic level, a stallion
syndicate involves multiple ownership of the stallion, and each
ownership interest (often called a "fractional interest" or a
"share") 4 entitles the owner to certain defined annual breeding
rights (often called "nominations" or "seasons") and obligates the
owner to share in the expenses of maintaining the stallion. In
thoroughbred syndicates, each fractional interest usually entitles
the owner to breed one mare per year to the stallion.5 In other
breeds, however, where artificial insemination permits the stal-
lion to be bred more frequently, each fractional interest may en-
title the member to multiple breeds per year. 6
The daily care of the stallions is entrusted to the syndicate
manager, who, typically, is the owner of or affiliated with the
farm where the stallion will stand for breeding. 7 It is the syndi-
4 Many attorneys prefer not to refer to the ownership interests in the syndicates as
"shares," since the mere characterization as such may increase the possibility that the in-
terest may be subject to securities laws. See United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837, 850-51 (1975) (indicating that the characterization of the transaction may affect
its inclusion within the definition of a security).
s See, e.g., John R. Gaines, SEC No-Action Letter (available Aug. 18, 1977) (in-
volving a thoroughbred stallion, with regard to which artifical insemination is prohibited,
where there were 40 interests in the syndicate).
The staff of the Commission will, in certain instances, respond to legal issues that
arise in the context of proposed securities transactions. In this regard, an attorney will
usually submit a "no-action" request on behalf of the client to the appropriate division of
the Commission. The request will typically contain a statement of the relevant facts, the
issue presented and the attorney's opinion as to the appropriate resolution of the issue. If
the division of the Commission agrees with the analysis of the attorney, it will issue a "no-
action letter" in which it states that, based upon the facts presented, it will not recom-
mend any enforcement action to the Commission if the transaction proceeds.
6 See, e.g., Khemosabi Syndication, SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 19,
1980) (involving an Arabian stallion, with regard to which artificial insemination is al-
lowed, where there were 126 interests in the syndicate).
7 See, e.g., Roosevelt, Franklin, D., Jr., SEC No-Action Letter (available Oct. 8,
1980).
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cate manager's responsibility to provide food, shelter and veter-
inary service for the horse and to supervise all breeding activity.
The syndicate manager may, in some instances, be assigned other
responsibilities, such as promoting the horse, providing insurance
or assisting the syndicate members who wish to sell their breed-
ing rights.8 Additionally, the syndicate manager maintains rec-
ords of the activities with regard to the stallions and the syndicate
and bills the owners for their pro rata share of the syndicate's ex-
penses. The syndicate manager is compensated for his or her ser-
vices by cash, 9 "free" breeding rights 0 or sometimes both."1
Participants in the major stallion syndications almost invari-
ably are engaged in the horse business and are serious breeders.
They purchase breeding rights to use in a manner that best suits
their own programs. As a result, breeding syndicates are care-
fully constructed to maintain maximum flexibility with regard to
how members use their breeding rights. Owners, therefore, nor-
mally have the option to sell their breeding rights for any partic-
ular year 12 or to breed a mare of their choice 13 to the stallion.
Usually, any owner may sell his or her share, subject to a right of
first purchase in favor of the other owners. "4
II. THE SECURITIES LEGISLATION
Anyone who practices securities law understands the compli-
cation caused when a particular transaction involves the sale of a
8 The permissible scope of the activity of the syndicate manager is limited by the se-
curities laws. See notes 25-102 infra and the accompanying text for further discussion.
9 See, e.g., *Aladdinn Syndicate Agreement (1978) (unpublished).
10 See, e.g., Roosevelt, Franklin D., Jr., supra note 7.
n See, e.g., Ariston Syndication Agreement, SEC No-Action Letter (available June
23, 1980); Ralph E., Jr., and Diana Schenck, SEC No-Action Letter (available Nov. 20,
1978).
12 Normally, this right of an owner to sell his or her breeding rights for a breeding
season is not subject to any right of first purchase in favor of the other owners. Rather,
such a sale requires only notice to the syndicate manager. See, e.g., Doc's Quixote Syndi-
cate Agreement, SEC No-Action Letter (available Nov. 3, 1977).
13 The syndicate manager invariably retains the right to refuse to breed any mare
that is unsound or diseased. See letter from Rick Fogle to Ann Glickman, Securities Ex-
change Commission (Dec. 23, 1981) (requesting a no-action letter) (letter appended to
Himito Dancer Syndicate Agreement, SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 5, 1982)).14 See, e.g., Mr. Crimson Ruler Syndicate Agreement, SEC No-Action Letter
(available Apr. 9, 1979).
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"security."' 15 Because the transaction becomes subject to the Se-
curities Act of 193316 (1933 Act), the Securities Exchange Act of
193417 (1934 Act) and state securities (blue sky) laws,' s the costs,
time necessary to complete the -deal and potential exposure to
legal problems increase dramatically. Even if one is not required
to register with the federal or state securities commissions, the
difficulty in insuring that the deal qualifies for an exemption
from such registration requirements increases both the expense
associated with the transaction and the time required for compe-
tent counsel to complete the deal. This is especially true if the
particular exemption from registration relied upon requires dis-
closures as a prerequisite to the availability of the exemption, 9
15 The Securities Act of 1933 defines a security as:
[A]ny note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebted-
ness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement,
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, trans-
ferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of de-
posit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "se-
curity," or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or in-
terim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to sub-
scribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976). The Securities Exchange Act of
1934 defines a security as:
[Any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other
mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization cer-
tificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any instru-
ment commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or par-
ticipation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include
currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which
has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclu-
sive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is like-
wise limited.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976).
16 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-7Thbbb (1976 & Supp. 1980).
17 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. 1980).
18 Kentucky's securities laws are found in chapter 292 of the Kentucky Revised Sta-
tutes. Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 292.310-.630 (Bobbs-Merrill 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1982) [herein-
after cited as KRS].
19 Even when one is using an exemption that does not require disclosures as a prereq-
uisite, such as Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 240.147 (1982), or Rule 504, 17 C.F.R. § 240.504
STALLION SYNDICATES
such as is usually required by Rule 50520 or Rule 506.21
In addition, the generous remedies available to plaintiffs un-
der state and federal securities laws increase the probability of a
successful lawsuit if the deal does not prove profitable. Section
12(1)2 of the 1933 Act, for example, provides a remedy against
one who fails to register or qualify for an exemption from regis-
tration. Section 12(2)21 under the 1933 Act and Rule lOb-52
under the 1934 Act provide attractive theories for purchasers
who claim that the deal was effected through material nondisclo-
sures or misstatements.
The result of all this, of course, is that persons who syndicate
stallions attempt to avoid these problems by structuring syndi-
cates to be outside the scope of state and federal securities law.
This requires that the syndicate be constructed and operated in
such a way that the fractional interests or shares in the syndicate
do not represent "securities" as that term is defined under state
and federal securities laws. The balance of this Article will be de-
voted to this problem.
III. THE LANDMARK CASES
Any attempt to determine whether a particular stallion syn-
dicate constitutes a security must start with a discussion of SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co. In that case, W.J. Howey Co. sold investors
small tracts of citrus acreage located in Florida and through an
affiliated company made available to the purchasers certain es-
sential services related to the management of the individual
tracts. These services included cultivating, developing, harvest-
ing and marketing the citrus crops. The majority of the investors
were not Florida residents and were characterized by the Court
(1982), most attorneys will recommend strongly that the offering include some kind of an
offering circular or memorandum in order to insure that all material disclosures are made.
This, of course, is to protect against fraud claims, including those authorized by Rule 10b-
5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982).
10 17 C.F.R. § 240.505 (1982).
21 Id. § 240.506 (1982).
2 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1976).
1 Id. § 771(2) (1976).
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.101-5 (1982).
2 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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as people "who lack the knowledge, skill and equipment neces-
sary for the care and cultivation of citrus trees."2'
In holding that the scheme involved the sale of an "invest-
ment contract," which by definition is a security,- the Court de-
fined an investment contract as a "contract, transaction or
scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enter-
prise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the pro-
moter or third party."'
Under the Howey definition, therefore, the existence of a se-
curity depends upon the presence of four2 elements: 1) an invest-
ment of money; 30 2) a common enterprise in which the money is
invested; 31 3) an expectation of profits;32 and 4) such expectation
2 id. at 296.
27 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(b)(1), 78c(a)(10) (1976).
28 328 U.S. at 298-99.
29 Usually, both commentators and courts separate the Howey test into only three
elements, combining two of the elements into one. There is, however, no consistency as to
which of the two elements are really one. Compare FitzGibbon, What Is a SecurityP-A
Redefinition Based on Eligibility to Participate in the Financial Markets, 64 MINN. L.
REv. 893, 900 (1980), with SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 477 (5th
Cir. 1974). It seems, however, a better analysis separates the definition into four separate
elements, especially after the "profits" elements apparently received separate treatment in
United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. at 837, 853-57.
30 For cases discussing and interpreting the "investment of money" element see, e.g.,
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); Union Planters Nat'l
Bank v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 651 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir.), cert. de-
nied,102 S. Ct. 972 (1981); McGovern Plaza Joint Venture v. First of Denver Mortgage
Investors, 562 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1977); Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1976);
El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900
(1974).
31 For cases discussing and interpreting the "common enterprise" element, see, e.g.,
651 F.2d at 1174; Westchester Corp. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 626 F.2d 1212
(5th Cir. 1980); Rosenburg v. Collins, 624 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1980); Curran v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980); affd, -U.S.-, 102
S. Ct. 1825 (1982); Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of America, Inc., 608 F.2d 187 (5th Cir.
1979), modified on rehearing, 611 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1980) (remanded on other grounds);
Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978); Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc.,
561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977); SEC v. Commodity Options Int'l, Inc., 553 F.2d 628 (9th
Cir. 1977); Bell v. Health-Mor, Inc., 549 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977); Ballard & Cordell
Corp. v. Zoller & Danneberg Exploration, Ltd., 544 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977); 533 F.2d at 429; 497 F.2d at 473; 494 F.2d at 1224.
32 For cases discussing and interpreting the "expectation of profits" element, see,
e.g., 421 U.S. at 837; 651 F.2d at 1174; 608 F.2d at 187; 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson,
503 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1974).
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of profits must be derived solely from the efforts of the promoter
or third party., Although each of these elements has generated
litigation, the fourth element, the requirement that the profits
come solely from the efforts of the promoter or third party, has
been litigated most. Also, this element is at the heart of most dif-
ficult questions surrounding stallion syndications.
As noted previously, the purchaser of a stallion share typical-
ly relies upon the syndicate manager to perform certain functions
with regard to the stallion and the syndicate. Invariably, the syn-
dicate manager is charged with the duty of daily care of the stal-
lion, including the supervision of all breeding. Likewise, the syn-
dicate manager will keep the records and accounts for the syndi-
cate and will bill and collect from the syndicate members their
pro rata share of the syndicate's expenses. In addition, the syndi-
cate manager may (or, more accurately, may try to convince the
syndicate's lawyer to allow him or her to) engage in a campaign
to promote the stallion, agree to act as agent for any syndicate
member who desires to sell his or her season in any year or, to the
extent excess nominations are available, sell those nominations on
behalf of the syndicate and divide the resulting revenues pro rata
among the syndicate membbrs.
Obviously, as the role of the syndicate manager increases, it
is more likely that the fourth element of Howey is present. The
difficult problem, of course, is to determine what functions the
syndicate manager can undertake without satisfying the fourth
element of the Howey test, since failure to satisfy that or any
other element of the Howey test causes the transaction to fall out-
side the definition of a security.-4
Confusion as to the proper formulation for the fourth ele-
ment exacerbates this whole problem. The confusion results from
3 As examples of litigation involving this issue, see 439 U.S. 551 (1979); Aldrich v.
McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1980); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); McLish v.
Harris Farms, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Cal. 1980).
34 One author, in commenting generally about the confusion surrounding the appli-
cation of the Howey test, stated: "In a clear majority of [the cases reported during the first
six months of 1979], it would have been difficult for anyone to predict the result, and in
none was a decision articulated that is likely to afford much predictability." FitzGibbon,
supra note 29, at 896 n.11.
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uncertainty as to whether "solely" literally means solely or, alter-
natively, whether an investment is still a security even though
some portion of the expected profits are to be derived from the ef-
forts of the investor or the impact of some extraneous force such
as natural appreciation or the effects of inflation.85
The Fifth Circuit faced this problem in SEC v. Koscot Inter-
planetary, Inc. ,36 a case in which the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) alleged that a pyramid scheme constituted a
security. In Koscot, each investor had paid a sum of money
which entitled him to become a representative for Koscot in the
sale of cosmetics. More importantly, each investor could earn
substantial sums by convincing others to become associated with
Koscot. These new participants would, of course, pay Koscot a
sum of money for the right to participate in the Koscot endeavor,
and the original investor who attracted the new participant re-
ceived a portion of the fees paid by the new participant.
Using the Howey test, the court concluded that the original
investors had invested money in a common enterprise. There
was, however, substantial difficulty in concluding that the orig-
inal investors' expected return .depended "solely" upon the efforts
of Koscot, since each original investor did play a role in attract-
ing and selling to the new participants.
Nevertheless, the court found that the scheme constituted a
security and, in the course of the opinion, used a standard that
softened the Howey language. The court stated that "the critical
inquiry is 'whether the efforts made by those other than the in-
vestor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential man-
agerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enter-
prise.' "38,
Koscot, therefore, stands for the proposition that a security
may be present even though the expectation of return depends,
35 Most of the circuits faced with the question have not interpreted the "solely' re-
quirement in any restrictive or literaf sense. See, e.g., 651 F.2d at 1174 (6th Cir.); Noa v.
Key Futures, Inc., 638 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1980); 608 F.2d at 187 (5th Cir.); Fargo Partners
v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1976); 497 F.2d at 473 (5th Cir.); Lino v. City In-
vesting Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973); 474 F.2d at 476 (9th Cir.).
36 497 F.2d at 473.
37 Id. at 478-79.
38 Id. at 483 (quoting 474 F.2d at 482).
1138 [Vol. 70
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at least to some degree, upon someone or something other than
the promoter. In other words, one should not read Howey's
"solely" language literally.
Although the Supreme Court has never expressly approved
the Koscot standard,39 it appears generally accepted that the
Howey formula can now be met if the efforts of the promoter or
third party are the "undeniably significant ones."'40 Demanding a
literal adherence to the "solely" language of Howey never made
sense because an investor who had even an insubstantial partic-
ipation in the business of the particular entity would lose the pro-
tection of the securities laws. In evaluating whether a stallion
syndicate involves a security, therefore, one should assume that
the existence of a security does not require literal satisfaction of
the "solely" language of Howey but requires only that the efforts
of the promoter or syndicate manager be the "undeniably signif-
icant ones."
Even if one accepts this notion, however, substantial inter-
pretative issues remain, since one must decide what degree of de-
pendency on the promoter or syndicate manager must be present
in order for his or her efforts to be classified as the "undeniably
significant ones." For example, would the promoter's efforts be
the "undeniably significant ones" if the expectations were that
the profits would depend fifty percent upon the efforts of the
promoter and fifty percent upon the efforts of the investor?
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman4' indicates, not
surprisingly, that no security will be present if the function of the
promoter is relatively insubstantial. In that case, tenants, as a
precondition to acquiring apartments in a particular apartment
complex, had been required to purchase shares in Riverbay, the
nonprofit cooperative housing corporation 42 that operated the
complex. The tenant could not sell or transfer these shares, and a
tenant who moved out of an apartment was required to offer the
39 See, e.g., 421 U.S. at 852 n.16.
40 See note 35 supra for a list of cases following the Koscot interpretation.
41 421 U.S. at 861.
42 Each tenant was required to purchase 18 shares of stock in Riverbay at $25 per
share for each room in an apartment. Thus, the cost for a four-room apartment was
$1,800. The Court stated that this was to act as a recoverable deposit. Id. at 842.
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shares back to Riverbay at the original purchase price of twenty-
five dollars per share.
Litigation resulted as cost overruns caused the apartments to
become significantly more expensive than anticipated. In that
litigation, the question arose whether the sale of the shares in
Riverbay involved the sales of securities, as defined in Howey.
The Court held that no security was involved in the sale,
since the tenants did not expect any "profit" in return for their
investment. This holding apparenty eliminated any need to con-
sider the question of whether the role of the promoter was suffi-
ciently significant to meet the "solely" language of Howey or
whether, alternatively, the Court was willing to modify that lan-
guage.
The Court was faced with the fact, however, that Riverbay
intended to lease commercial space in the complex and use the
revenue to lower the rent charged to the tenants. As much as $1
million per year was anticipated from this source. 43 The Court
dismissed this factor, stating: "[T]his income-if indeed there is
any-is far too speculative and insubstantial to bring the entire
transaction within the Securities Acts." 44
If, indeed, one believes that revenue of $1 million is "insub-
stantial," Forman is consistent with both Howey and Koscot.
Since the profits or revenues to be derived from Riverbay's oper-
ation of the commercial facilities were "insubstantial," River-
bay's efforts would seem insignificant to the investor and thus not
the "undeniably significant" efforts within the standard of Kos-
cot, or the efforts that were "solely" important to the investors.
Four years after its opinion in Forman, the Supreme Court
decided International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel4 and
again interpreted the definition of a security. Daniel was em-
ployed by a trucking firm that had a compulsory and noncontrib-
utory46 pension plan for its employees. Upon his retirement,
43 421 U.S. at 837 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 856.
45 439 U.S. at 551.
46 As the Court described the plan: "Employees had no choice as to participation in
the plan and did not have the option of demanding that the employer's contribution be
paid directly to them as a substitute for pension eligibility. The employees paid nothing to
the plan themselves." Id. at 553.
1140 [Vol. 70
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Daniel applied for his benefits, which were denied because he
did not meet the requirement of "continuous service." A lawsuit
resulted, with Daniel claiming that his participation in the plan
constituted a purchase of a security and that such purchase had
been made in violation of the fraud provisions of the 1933 Act
and the 1934 Act.
The Supreme Court applied the Howey test and held that
Daniel's participation in the pension fund did not involve the
purchase of a "security." One basis47 for this holding was that any
expectation of profit by Daniel did not depend sufficiently upon
the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others to meet the
Howey test. Although the Court recognized that the pensions of
the participants in the plan depended "to some extent on earn-
ings from the assets," the Court concluded that "a far larger por-
tion of its income comes from employer contributions, a source in
no way dependent on the efforts of the Fund's managers." 48 In-
terestingly, however, the Court did provide some figures with re-
gard to the earnings of the fund and the contributions of em-
ployers to the fund over a twenty-two year period. During that
time, earnings on investments amounted to $31 million, while
contributions from employers amounted to $153 million. 49 This
means that approximately seventeen percent of the total fund
available to pay pensions was generated by the investment activ-
ity of the fund's managers.
Another factor, however, made any expectation of profit by
a participant even less dependant on the efforts of the fund's
managers. As the Court pointed out, "the principal barrier to an
individual employee's realization of pension benefits .. .is his
own ability to meet the Fund's eligibility requirements." 50 As a
result, the Court concluded that any "profit would depend pri-
marily on the employee's efforts to meet the vesting require-
ments, rather than the Fund's investment success." 5'
After the Court's decision in Daniel, the definition of a secur-
47The Court also found that there had been no "investment of money" by the partic-
ipants in the plan. Id. at 559-61.
48 Id. at 561-62.
49 Id. at 562.
0 Id.
51 Id.
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ity still was not a model of clarity. Nevertheless, one attempting
to draft a stallion syndicate had some significant signals to use for
guidance. First, the criteria for determining whether a stallion
syndicate constituted a security were contained in the Howey
test, except probably the requirement that the expectation of
profits be derived "solely" from the promoter's efforts. Second,
with regard to that critical fourth element of the Howey test, one
might reasonably assume that it could be satisfied if the efforts of
the promoter or third party were "undeniably significant."2
Third, Daniel provided a concrete factual pattern that gave at
least some guidance with regard to that fourth element. In
Daniel, the Court held that the role of the fund's manager was
not sufficient to satisfy the fourth element even though approx-
imately seventeen percent of the entire return was due to his in-
vestment and the entire fund was subject to his discretion and
management.
This modicum of clarity, however, may have been destroyed
by the Supreme Court's latest case in this area, Marine Bank v.
Weaver.53 In that case, the plaintiffs, the Weavers, pledged 4 a
certificate of deposit to Marine Bank in order to secure a loan by
Marine Bank to a third party, Columbus Packing Company. In
return for the Weavers' pledge of the certificate of deposit, the
owners of Columbus, the Piccirillos, agreed to pay the Weavers
fifty percent of Columbus' net profits and one hundred dollars
per month. When the situation deteriorated and it appeared that
Marine Bank would resort to the Weavers' certificate of deposit
as a way to liquidate the loan, the Weavers sued, claiming that
the transaction violated Rule 10b-555 of the 1934 Act. Specifical-
ly, the Weavers claimed that material nondisclosures and mis-
statements were made in connection with their pledge of the cer-
tificate of deposit to the bank and their agreement with the Pic-
cirillos.
52 See note 35 supra for a list of cases which have not interpreted the "solely" require-
ment in a literal manner.
53 --U.S.--, 102 S. Ct. 1220 (1982).
54 The Supreme Court previously held that a pledge of a security constitutes a sale of
a security for the purposes of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws. Rubin v.
United States, 449 U.S. 424 (1981).
55 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979).
1142 [Vol. 70
STALLION SYNDICATES
The Supreme Court held, however, that neither the certif-
icate of deposit nor the agreement between the Weavers and the
Piccirillos was a security under the 1934 Act and, therefore, the
Weavers had no claim under Rule 10b-5. In holding that the cer-
tificate of deposit pledged to the bank was not a security, the
Court recognized that debt instruments can in some instances
constitute securities under the 1934 Act. The Court, however,
concluded that persons purchasing certificates of deposit did not
need the special fraud protection of the 1934 Act, because the
certificates are issued by institutions subject to comprehensive
regulation, and because the deposits are insured by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation.57
With regard to the agreement between the Weavers and the
Piccirillos, the court of appeals had concluded that the transac-
tion might have involved the sale of a security to the Weavers.s8
One basis for that decision was the Howey case,59 since the court
of appeals determined that the transaction could be viewed as a
$50,000 investment by the Weavers motivated by their desire to
earn profits from a business run by the Piccirillos.
Using an unorthodox and confusing analysis, the Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals decision and held that the
agreement between the Weavers and the Piccirillos did not in-
volve a security. Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous
Court, did not rely upon the traditional Howey analysis in decid-
ing the case; interestingly, neither did he reject the Howey anal-
ysis. Instead, he seemed to base his decision upon the notion that
"Congress intended the securities laws to cover those instruments
ordinarily and commonly considered to be securities in the
commercial world." Chief Justice Burger pointed out that in
the previous cases where "unusual instruments [were] found [by
the Court] to constitute securities," there had been "offers to a
number of potential investors" and the instruments "had equiv-
56 The definition of a security under the 1934 Act includes "any note... bond, [or]
debenture." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976).
5 -U.S. at--, 102S. Ct. at 1224-25.
58 Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1980) rev'd, -U.S.--, 102 S.
Ct. 1220 (1982).
59 Id. at 161-62.
60 -U.S. at--, 102 S. Ct. at 1225.
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alent values to most persons and could have been traded public-
ly."6 The Court concluded by holding "that this unique agree-
ment, negotiated one-on-one by the parties, is not a security."6 2
It is difficult to restrain the urge to be overly harsh in criticiz-
ing Marine Bank. It is a thoroughly confusing case. At least the
Court should have indicated whether the analysis in Marine
Bank replaces the Howey analysis. If Marine Bank does represent
a break with the Howey test, the Court should have given more
guidance regarding the criteria it will use to determine the exis-
tence of a security where an "unusual instrument" is involved. If
the Howey test has not been replaced, the Court should have
provided some guidance as to the appropriate use of Howey after
the Marine Bank decision. Forty or so confusing lines may not
have fulfilled the Court's obligation to foster an orderly develop-
ment of the law.
Even though Marine Bank is so unclear, one obviously can-
not dismiss the case as irrelevant. It is, after all, the Supreme
Court's latest decision in the area and is unquestionably signif-
icant. One should not, however, underestimate the difficulty in
applying the case to concrete situations, such as stallion syndi-
cates.
In that regard, it is possible to interpret Marine Bank in two
very different ways. First, one could read the decision narrowly
and conclude that it eliminates from the definition of a security
only unique agreements negotiated face-to-face between no more
than two parties. Alternatively, it is possible to read Marine Bank
as holding that the definition of a security includes only instru-
ments that have equivalent values to most persons and can be
traded publicly. Obviously, this latter interpretation would elim-
inate from the definition of a security significantly more transac-
tions than would the first interpretation.
If the latter interpretation were correct, Marine Bank could
be an important case with regard to stallion syndications and the
scope of theresponsibilities that can be allocated to the syndicate
manager. Stallion shares do not have equivalent values to all in-
61 Id.
62 Id.
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vestors. Although the shares have value to the serious breeder,
who can either use the breeding rights in his or her own program
or sell the breeding rights to others in the industry, stallion shares
would not be an attractive alternative for the average investor,
who has neither the mares nor access to the potential purchasers
of seasons necessary to maximize the value of his or her invest-
ment. Increasing the role of the syndicate manager, except in an
extreme situation, would not seem to affect the foregoing anal-
ysis. So long as a stallion share involves breeding rights controlled
by the syndicate member, that share would not have equivalent
values to the serious breeder and the average investor in secur-
ities, even if the syndicate manager assumed additional responsi-
bilities.
The result of all this could be greater flexibility in the terms
of future syndicate agreements. Attorneys and horse owners
might be willing to allocate more responsibilities to the syndicate
manager, even though those added responsibilities might bring
the transaction dangerously close to the criteria established by
Howey and its progeny.
Unfortunately, one cannot be sure of the proper interpreta-
tion of Marine Bank; thus, assuming such an aggressive posture
with regard to the allocation of additional responsibilities to the
syndicate manager may involve substantial risk. Additionally, it
is not at all clear that the Marine Bank decision will cause the
Commission to realign its position with regard to stallion syndi-
cations. Certainly, the no-action letters issued by the staff after
Marine Bank give no hint of any change.6
The safer course, therefore, is to interpret Marine Bank as a
case limited in its scope and to continue to evaluate stallion syn-
dications and the permissible limits of the role of the syndicate
manager in the traditional manner. This means that one would
still seek guidance from Howey, Forman, Koscot and Daniel, as
well as from the no-action letters and releases of the Commission.
For more adventuresome souls, however, Marine Bank may pro-
vide some theoretical basis for deviating from the traditional syn-
6 Dave Parker Quarterhorses, SEC No-Action Letter (available July 8, 1982); Gin
& Peppy Horse Syndication, SEC No-Action Letter (available June 25, 1982); Eskimos
Stallion Syndication, SEC No-Action Letter (available April 15,1982).
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dicate and its allocation of limited responsibilities to the syndi-
cate manager.
IV. THE POSITION OF THE SEC
A. Generally
Our research disclosed more than thirty no-action requests
addressed to the staff regarding stallion syndications.6 Although
the letters involved horses of various breeds65 and quality, the
terms of the syndicates were usually quite similar. Another sim-
ilarity was the generally favorable response of the staff to the no-
64 Dave Parker Quarterhorses, SEC No-Action Letter (available July 8, 1982); Gin
& Peppy Horse Syndication, SEC No-Action Letter (available June 25, 1982); Eskimos
Stallion Syndication, SEC No-Action Letter (available Apr. 15, 1982); Secret Passage Syn-
dication Agreement, SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 22, 1982); Himito Dancer
Syndicate Agreement, SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 5, 1982); Dale Ross Lloyd &
Lake, SEC No-Action Letter (available Dec. 14, 1981); Blaze Drift Syndicate, SEC No-
Action Letter (available Oct. 29, 1981); B.F. Phillips, Jr., SEC No-Action Letter
(available Oct. 21, 1981); Markegard, Boy L., SEC No-Action Letter (available June 11,
1981); New Frontier Investments, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (available June 4, 1981);
Owens, Marjorie, SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 27, 1981); Carrico, Norman T.
and Paula, SEC No-Action Letter (available Dec. 12, 1980); Winger, Richard, SEC No-
Action Letter (available Nov. 21, 1980); Roosevelt, Franklin D., Jr., SEC No-Action
Letter (available Oct. 8, 1980); Ariston Syndication Agreement, SEC No-Action Letter
(available June 23, 1980); Downing, Cathy and Marianne, SEC No-Action Letter
(available June 23, 1980); Ostrer Brothers, SEC No-Action Letter (available June 23,
1980); Murphy, Gregory J., SEC No-Action Letter (available May 5, 1980); Khemosabi
Syndication, SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 19, 1980); J.E. Garrett, SEC No-
Action Letter (available Sept. 20, 1979); Darrell Keener, SEC No-Action Letter (available
Apr. 23, 1979); B.F. Phillips, Jr., SEC No-Action Letter (available Apr. 9, 1979); Reese
Evans Howard, SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 23, 1979); Schenck, Ralph E., Jr.
and Diana, SEC No-Action Letter (available Nov. 20, 1978); Stallions Unlimited, Inc.,
SEC No-Action Letter (available Nov. 13, 1978); Kennaugh, Robert Q., SEC No-Action
Letter (available Oct. 12, 1978); Rheusdasile, Jerry, SEC No-Action Letter (available
Oct. 11, 1978); B.F. Phillips, Jr., SEC No-Action Letter (available Sept. 21, 1978); B.F.
Phillips, Jr., SEC No-Action Letter (available Mar. 23, 1978); B.F. Phillips, Jr., SEC No-
Action Letter (available Feb. 16, 1978); Crumpler, Paul, SEC No-Action Letter
(available Nov. 3, 1977); John R. Gaines, SEC No-Action Letter (available Aug. 18,
1977); Pink Lady Farms, SEC No-Action Letter (available July 18, 1977); J.D.A. Farms,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (available Dec. 29,1976).
65 Generally, however, most letters involved thoroughbreds, standardbreds,
Arabians or quarter horses.
' For a discussion of terms commonly found in the syndicate agreements, see notes
4-14 supra and accompanying text.
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action requests.6 Some of the no-action positions, however, had
apparently been the subject of some negotiations with the staff. 6
The no-action letters reveal that the Commission has uni-
formly taken the position that a share in a stallion syndicate is not
a security, provided the syndicate manager does no more than
care for the horse and perform certain ministerial functions for
the syndicate. This position seems quite consistent with both
Howey7° and Koscot,71 since the role of the syndicate manager
would seem too insignificant to meet either test. Certainly, the
expectation of return for any syndicate member participating in
such a syndicate depends principally upon factors beyond the
control of the syndicate manager, and thus, the efforts of the syn-
dicate manager could not be classified as solely or undeniably sig-
nificant.
With human nature and business pressures being what they
are, one should not be surprised to find that syndicate managers
often want to engage in activities other than feeding the horse
and cleaning its stall. The syndicate manager may want to
engage in a substantial promotional campaign on behalf of the
horse and the syndicate, act as a broker (with or without com-
pensation) for syndicate members who may desire to sell their
annual breeding rights or sell any "excess nominations" on behalf
of the syndicate and distribute the revenues pro rata among the
syndicate members. Similarly, the original owner (who may or
may not become the syndicate manager) may wish to, syndicate
the stallion before it is retired from racing, showing or other per-
formances. As more responsibilities such as the foregoing are
allocated to the syndicate manager or the original owner, his or
her efforts become more significant, and it becomes more likely
that those efforts may meet the standard of Koscot or Howey.
67 But see J.D.A. Farms, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (available Dec. 29, 1979) (staff
refused to take a no-action position).
68 See, e.g., Himito Dancer Syndicate Agreement, SEC No-Action Letter (available
Feb. 5, 1982).
6 See, e.g., Cathy and Marianne Downing, SEC No-Action Letter (available June
23, 1980). The staff took a no-action position with regard to the syndication of the Arabian
stallion, Shah Zam.70 See notes 25-35 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Howey.
71 See notes 35-39 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Koscot.
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Understandably, attorneys become more nervous as the syndi-
cate manager's role increases in significance.
B. Promotion of the Stallion and the Syndicate
As a practical matter, the syndicate manager always pro-
motes a valuable stallion standing on his or her farm. Such pro-
motion is beneficial to the syndicate members, especially if one
decides to sell a nomination or share, and to the syndicate man-
ager, who is anxious to advertise the successful attraction of qual-
ity stallions to his or her farm. The promotion may take the form
of advertisements in the various trade magazines, 72 although
other methods are sometimes used.73 People who participate in
stallion syndicates understand that this promotion will occur,
and some syndicates even provide for a special promotion fee to
be paid the syndicate manager on a yearly basis. 74
No attempt appears to have been made to hide this from the
Commission in the no-action requests. A number of the requests
for no-action letters specifically referred to reimbursement of the
syndicate manager for expenses encountered in promoting and
advertising the stallion. 75 In one no-action request, the syndicate
agreement required each member to pay an annual promotion
fee, which would be used by the syndicate manager for advertis-
ing and promotion. 76
In all these cases, the staff was able to assume a no-action po-
sition. In fact, the presence of promotion by the syndicate man-
ager did not appear to draw any special attention from the staff,
although one cannot, of course, be certain about that matter.
Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which the
promotion of a stallion could be so significant that the role of the
syndicate manager could meet the Koscot test. Whatever the
72 See, e.g., 108 THE BLOOD-HORSE at 6796 (Oct. 9, 1982); THE HORSEME'S J. Oct.
1982, at 8-9.
73 Promotion most commonly occurs through word of mouth and the syndicate man-
ager's informal efforts.
74 Ariston Syndication Agreement, SEC No-Action Letter (available June 23,1980).
75 See, e.g., Owens, Majorie, SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 27, 1981); Stal-
lions Unlimited, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (available Nov. 13,1978).76 Ariston Syndication Agreement, SEC No-Action Letter (available June 23, 1980).
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level of promotion, syndicate members still must decide whether
to sell their nominations or breed their own mares, whether to
sell the mare in foal or wait for the foal to be born and whether to
sell the offspring as a yearling or train the horse for the track or
the show ring. Any expectation of return to the syndicate mem-
ber still depends upon his or her action, whatever the level of
promotion.
C. Racing or Showing the Horse after Syndication
Stallion syndicates sometimes provide that the stallion will
continue to be raced or shown after the syndication but before
the stallion is retired to stud.77 In the case of the thoroughbreds,
for example, a top three-year-old may be syndicated78 after the
Triple Crown, but before the completion of the fall campaign. 79
The question arises, therefore, whether such a provision in a syn-
dicate agreement increases the possibility that a syndicate agree-
ment may be considered a security.
Before one can determine the impact of such a provision,
however, it is essential to understand the way racing animals and
show animals are trained, developed and cared for. As a practi-
cal matter, a group of thirty-six syndicate members cannot pos-
sibly govern the career of a racing animal, at least with regard to
the important day-to-day decisions. For example, because selec-
tions of jockeys or drivers, tracks and races do not lend them-
selves to decisions by scattered members of a group, those deci-
sions must be delegated during the racing career of any syndi-
cated animal. 80 Similar problems require similar delegation with
77 See, e.g., Himito Dancer Syndicate Agreement, SEC No-Action Letter (available
Feb. 5, 1982); Blaze Drift Syndicate Agreement, SEC No-Action Letter (available Oct.
29,1981).
78 Sometimes, the agreement signed by the syndicate member is more in the nature
of an agreement to syndicate at the end of the racing career. Although these agreements
usually provide that the syndicate will not become effective until the horse is retired, the
obligation and rights of the parties with regard to the syndicate are determined at the date
of the agreement, which is before the horse is retired.
79 A recent, notable example of this was Conquistador Cielo, syndicated in August of
1982, with the syndicate to become effective at a later date.
8o Attempts to allocate management responsibilities equally among the syndicate
members have not resulted in the staffs taking a no-action position. In Secret.Passage Syn-
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regard to any show animal that is syndicated. Obviously, such
delegation increases, at least to some degree, the dependence of
the syndicate members on some third party.8'
In this area, however, the staff has concluded that a syndi-
cate agreement will not be deemed a security simply because the
horse will continue to be raced or shown for a period of time after
syndication. The no-action letter regarding Himito Dancer, 2 a
quarter horse stallion, provides an example of this. In that situa-
tion, it was anticipated that the syndicate would be formed in
1982 but that the stallion would not be bred until after the Super
Stakes in 1984. Until that time, the horse would be in cutting
training and would be shown. Although the staff issued a no-ac-
tion letter for the Himito Dancer Syndicate, the attorney re-
questing the letter apparently acceded to the staffs request that
"earnings as a result of races or shows, if any, must be retained
by the sellers (who must also be responsible for any training ex-
penses and entry fees) and are not shared or distributed among
shareholders."83
It is interesting to note that the no-action position of the staff
was taken in an instance where the delay in syndication was sub-
stantial, two years, and there was the possibility of substantial
revenues and substantial changes in the value of the horse. If the
dicate Agreement, SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 22, 1982), the staff refused to
take a position as to whether such shared management responsibilities would remove the
syndicate agreement from the definition of a security. Id. There is, however, some support
for the notion that such shared management responsibility would result in the transac-
tion's not being considered a security. See Frazier v. Manson, 651 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir.
1981).
81 Such considerations have convinced this writer that racing syndicates generally
would be deemed securities, since the realities of an active racing career make it difficult
to avoid substantial delegation of managerial responsibilities. If, however, a small group
of horse owners form a racing syndicate and each participates in the management of the
horse, that syndicate should not be considered a security, since no investor is relying on the
managerial efforts of another. Even in that case, the Commission has refused to take a no-
action position. For a discussion of this matter see note 80 supra.82 Himito Dancer Syndicate Agreement, SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 5,
1982).
83 Letter from Rick Fogle to Ann Glickman, Securities Exchange Commission (Dec.
23, 1981) (requesting a no-action letter) (letter appended to Himito Dancer Syndication
Agreement, SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 5,1982)). In an earlier no-action letter,
the staff had taken a similar position. Blaze Drift Syndicate Agreement, SEC No-Action
Letter (available Oct. 29, 1981).
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staff was inclined to refuse a no-action request, such facts would
certainly have elicited that response.
In an earlier no-action letter involving the syndication of
another quarter horse, Blaze Drift,8 it was anticipated that the
horse would be shown after syndication. That syndication agree-
ment contained the following provision: "Any prize money
earned by the Stallion in competition shall accrue to the Syndi-
cate, to be used to defray the expenses of the Syndicate." Al-
though the staff was willing to take a no-action position with re-
gard to the Blaze Drift syndicate, one should not assume that all
prize money can accrue to the benefit of the syndicate members.
In the Blaze Drift situation, it was estimated that the maximum
prize money per year would amount to only $2,000, which
would not even cover the normal expenses of such a horse. 8 The
staff would undoubtedly take a different position if significant
prize money would accrue to the benefit of the syndicate mem-
bers. In that case, the staff would probably rely upon the resolu-
tion imposed in the syndication of Himito Dancer and require
such prize money to accrue to the benefit of the original owners.
In any event, the staff's position does permit the owner to
syndicate or agree to syndicate a stallion prior to the termination
of its racing or showing career. There may, of course, be substan-
tial and legitimate business reasons why such early syndication is
desirable or necessary.
D. Acting as a "Broker"for the Nominations
A more difficult question arises when the syndicate agree-
ment includes a provision that requires or permits the syndicate
manager to act as a broker or selling agent for syndicate members
desiring to sell their breeding rights. Certainly such a provision
would benefit syndicate members who may reasonably antic-
ipate they may not use all their breeding rights in every breeding
season. Likewise, the syndicate manager may benefit from such
8 Blaze Drift Syndicate, SEC No-Action Letter (available Oct. 29, 1981).
8 Letter from Bruce MacGregor Hall to the SEC (Aug. 27, 1981) (requesting a no-
action letter) (letter appended to Blaze Drift Syndicate, SEC No-Action Letter (available
Oct. 29, 1981)).
86 Id.
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an arrangement even if he or she receives no fee for such services.
The manager may find some new, quality mares for the stallion,
as well as build up good will among other breeders, if desirable
breeding rights are obtained for such breeders.
In an extreme case, such a provision could cause a stallion
syndicate to become a security under a Howey analysis. For
example, assume the owner of a stallion forms a syndicate and
sells the shares to people who are not in the horse business. As-
sume further that the purchasers were induced to buy the syndi-
cate shares by promises that the syndicate manager would,
through his or her contacts in the horse industry, sell all of the
purchasers' breeding rights each year. In that case, the investor
would be relying upon the efforts of the syndicate manager, and
the entire transaction would seem to involve a security. 7
It should be emphasized, however, that the foregoing is an
extreme example and is not a situation that is typical in the horse
business. As stated earlier, purchasers of interests in stallion syn-
dicates invariably are in the horse business and are purchasing
breeding rights to use in their particular programs. Although it
may be convenient for syndicate members to have the syndicate
manager act as their agent for the sale of unused breeding rights,
that arrangement is in no way the principal factor in one's choice
to purchase a stallion share. For reasons previously stated, syndi-
cate members still have the major responsibility with regard to
any income they may be able to generate." Consequently, the in-
clusion of a term in the syndicate agreement that obligates the
syndicate manager to act as a broker for the syndicate members
should not cause the syndicate to become a security within the
Howey formula.
Unfortunately, it appears that the Commission does not
necessarily agree with this position. A request for a no-action let-
ter concerning the syndication of the paint stallion, Sonsational,9
87 Obviously, the facts begin to look very similar to those in SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co., 329 U.S. at 293, where the Supreme Court concluded that a security was involved.
For a discussion of Howey, see notes 25-35 supra and accompanying text.
8 For a discussion of the syndicate members' responsibility, see text accompanying
notes 72-76 supra.
89 Ralph E., Jr. and Diana Schenek, SEC No-Action Letter (available Nov. 20,
1978).
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revealed that the proposed syndication agreement contained a
provision obligating the syndicate manager to act as an agent for
the syndicate members in securing buyers for any unused breed-
ings.9° Each syndicate member was entitled to three breedings
per year to the stallion, and it was represented in the request let-
ter that all purchasers were "breeders who wish to breed Sonsa-
tional to mares." 9' This would seem to indicate that the pur-
chasers were serious breeders who likely would use the breeding
rights in their own programs. Nevertheless, the staff issued a no-
action letter only after the agency provision was removed.
It is difficult to understand the basis for the staffs objection
in the case of Sonsational syndication even in 1978, when the let-
ter was issued. Since that time, of course, the Supreme Court has
decided Daniel,92 which bolsters the conclusion that the Sonsa-
tional syndicate agreement, even with the provision obligating
the syndicate manager to act as an agent, should not constitute a
security. Certainly the role of the syndicate manager in the Son-
sational syndicate was less significant than that of the fund's
manager in Daniel.93
Even if one were convinced that a term in the syndicate
agreement providing for such an agency arrangement would
cause a syndicate to constitute a security, that does not mean that
the syndicate manager cannot act on behalf of a syndicate mem-
ber in order to find a buyer for that member's breeding rights. If
the syndicate agreement does not contain an agency provision
and if the share is sold without emphasis on such possible activ-
ity, a syndicate share will not become a security, even though
such activity in fact occurs after the syndicate is complete. 94
90 Letter from Brent A. Schlottman to Securities Exchange Commission (Aug. 24,
1978) (requesting a no-action letter) (letter appended to Ralph E., Jr. and Diana Schenck,
SEC No-Action Letter (available Nov. 20, 1978)).
91 Id.
92 439 U.S. at 441. For a discussion of Daniel, see notes 45-52supra and accompany-
ing text.
93 For a discussion of the fund manager's role see notes 47-52 supra and accompany-
ing text.
94 As a practical matter, it is impossible to restrain such activity. The obvious focal
point for any syndicate is the syndicate manager. If one wants to breed to a syndicated
stallion, therefore, he is likely to call the syndicate manager to inquire concerning avail-
able breeding. Clearly, the syndicate manager must respond to such inquiries.
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Support for this notion can be found in the Commission's
famous Condominium Release, issued in 1973.95 In that release,
the Commission stated that a condominium could become a se-
curity if sold with a rental arrangement, where the unit was "of-
fered and sold with emphasis on the economic benefits to the
purchaser to be derived from the managerial efforts of the pro-
mdter." 16 The Commission went on to say, however, that if the
unit were originally sold without such emphasis, the promoter or
an affiliate could later agree to act as rental agent for the pur-
chaser.
The theory here, apparently, is based upon the Howey for-
mula, which requires an expectation of profits to come from the
efforts of the promoter or third party.7 If the promoter's role
after the sale is not emphasized, then it is reasonable to assume
that the investor's expectation of profits must have been based
upon some other factor. This is true even if after the sale the pro-
moter in fact performs services for the investor. The status of an
investment contract is determined at the time of investment,
rather than by subsequent developments.
The safer course, therefore, would be to omit any such
agency provision from the syndicate agreement and omit any em-
phasis on the possibility of such activity. In that instance, even if
such activity in fact later occurs, the Commission would not be
likely to conclude that the syndication agreement constituted a
security. If, however, the syndicate agreement contains such a
provision or if the syndicate shares are sold by emphasizing the
availability of such services, the staff, if confronted with the
question, may well conclude that the syndicate shares constitute
securities. In light of recent Supreme Court cases, that conclu-
sion seems indefensible, except in the most extreme cases.
E. Pooling of Proceeds from the Sale of Breeding Rights
In the event extra breedings become available to a stallion,
95 Offers and Sales of Condominiums or Units in a Real Estate Development, 1 FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1049 (Jan. 4, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Condominium Release]; 17
C.F.R. § 231.5382 (1973).
9 Condominium Release, supra note 95, at 2072.
1 For a discussion of this element, see notes 33-34 supra and accompanying text.
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some allocation of those rights must be made among the syndi-
cate members. The question has arisen as to whether the syndi-
cate agreement can provide for a sale of such breeding rights by
the syndicate manager and a distribution of resulting revenues
pro rata among the members of the syndicate. In order to under-
stand the impact of such a provision (usually referred to as a
"pooling" provision) in a syndicate, one can refer to a thorough-
bred syndicate.
Typically, thoroughbred syndicates have about forty shares.
Even with the "free" nominations that may be provided to the
syndicate manager and sometimes to the trainer of the horse,
syndicates normally will require less than fifty breedings to satis-
fy the annual requirements of the syndicate agreement.1 Espe-
cially while the stallion is young and healthy, he can and usually
does cover more than fifty mares per breeding season. Sixty
mares per breeding season is not uncommon for a young stallion,
and eighty mares per season is not unheard of.
As a result of a stark fear of state and federal securities laws,
these excess nominations have usually been allocated directly to
the members of the syndicate, who then use the excess breeding
rights as they see fit. Literally every successful no-action request
contains promises that there will be no pooling of any revenues
and that excess nominations will be allocated by lot.w
Syndicate managers, however, are generally unhappy with
these provisions. They argue that to permit them to sell the excess
nominations and distribute the proceeds gives them at least some
control of the mares that are bred to the stallion. This control,
they contend, will help insure higher quality mares for the stal-
lion and will benefit everyone, as the quality of the progeny in-
creases.
Whatever the need for pooling provisions, the Commission's
position is that pooling of revenues causes a transaction like a
98 In the syndication of the thoroughbred, Duns Scotus, for example, there were 40
syndicate shares, the owner of the farm where the horse was to stand received four "free"
nominations per breeding season, and the trainer received one nomination per breeding
season. See Roosevelt, Franklin D., Jr., SEC No-Action Letter (available Oct. 8, 1980).
99 See, e.g., letter from Dennis H. Taylor to Securities and Exchange Commission
(April 21, 1982) (requesting a no-action letter) (letter appended to Dave Parker Quarter
Horses, SEC No-Action Letter (available July 8,1982)).
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stallion syndicate to become a security. Perhaps the Commission
would not take such a position if the revenues were de min-
imus, 100 but even that is not clear.
This notion is contained in the Commission's Condominium
Release,101 where the Commission concluded that the offer of a
condominium unit in conjunction with the offering of participa-
tion in a rental pool arrangement would cause the transaction to
be viewed as an investment contract and, thus, a security. The
Commission explained what it meant by a rental pool arrange-
ment as follows:
[The rental pool is a device whereby the promoter or a third
party undertakes to rent the unit on behalf of the actual owner
during that period of time when the unit is not in use by the
owner. The rents received and the expenses attributable to
rental of all the units in the project are combined and the indi-
vidual owner receives a ratable share of the rental proceeds re-
gardless of whether his individual unit was actually rented.102
It should be apparent that if a syndicate manager sells breeding
rights and pools the income, it is difficult to distinguish the situa-
tion from the sale of a condominium with a pooling agreement.
The basis for the Commission's conclusion that pooling
causes a condominium to become a security has never been clear
to this writer. Since the presence of an investment contract re-
quires that all elements of the Howey formula must be met, the
efforts of the promoter in the case of a condominium unit with a
pooling arrangement must be the "undeniably significant" ef-
forts. Otherwise, the last element of the Howey test is not met.
Certainly, if the promoter generates a relatively large sum of
100 With regard to the syndication of the quarter horse, Blaze Drift, it was provided
that the horse would be shown competitively after syndication. As to any prize money re-
ceived from such competition, the syndicate agreement provided: "Any prize money
earned by the Stallion in competition shall accrue to the Syndicate, to be used to defray the
expenses of the Syndicate." Although this obviously permitted the pooling of prize money,
the amount was de minimus. It was estimated that the horse would earn only $2,000 per
year. Letter from Bruce MacGregor Hall to Securities and Exchange Commission (August
27, 1981) (requesting a no-action letter) (letter appended to Blaze Drift Syndicate, SEC
No-Action Letter (available Oct. 29, 1981)).
101 Condominium Release, supra note 95 at 1049.
102 Id.
1156 [Vol. 70
STALLION SYNDICATES
money from the rental of the condominium units, that activity
may be significant, and an investment contract may be present.
On the other hand, if the particular pooling arrangement in-
volves a relatively insignificant amount of money, those efforts
would not be the "undeniably significant ones," and, according-
ly, the Howey standard would not be satisfied.
As a result, there is nothing magical about a pooling agree-
ment. Rather it is simply another managerial function that may
be assigned to a promoter or third party, and its importance
should be evaluated in light of the other facts of the transaction.
If the pooling arrangement, when considered with the other se-
vices of the promoter or third party, causes the efforts of the pro-
moter or third party to become the "undeniably significant
ones," then an investment contract will be found, assuming the
other elements of Howey are present. A pooling agreement
standing alone, however, does not necessarily satisfy the Howey
test.
If the foregoing criticism and analysis are correct, a pooling
provision should not necessarily cause a stallion syndicate to be-
come a security, unless the pooling provision together with the
other functions performed by the syndicate manager constitute
undeniably significant efforts with regard to the expectation of
income by the syndicate members. The difficulty, of course, is
applying this notion in a concrete situation.
If a typical stallion syndicate requires fifty nominations per
breeding season and provides for pooling with regard to ten extra
nominations, one can make strong arguments that a security is
not present. In such a situation, the syndicate members' expecta-
tion of value depends essentially upon two factors: first, the suc-
cess of the stallion as a sire, and second, the ability of the syndi-
cate member to use his or her breeding rights successfully. The
fact that approximately one-sixth of the nominations will be sold
by the syndicate manager, even when considered with his or her
other functions, should not cause the syndicate manager's efforts
to be the "undeniably significant" ones. The Daniel case supports
this conclusion. If, however, the syndicate manager undertook
the obligation to sell one-half of all nominations, it would be
more difficult to defend that situation from the claim that it con-
stituted a security. That activity, when considered with the other
functions performed by the syndicate manager, may cause the
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role of the syndicate manager to become the undeniably signif-
icant one.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, under existing authority, typical stallion syndicates
are not securities. This Article has suggested that they do not be-
come securities even if the role of the syndicate manager is ex-
panded. At some point, the role of the syndicate manager could
become so significant that the syndicate share may constitute a
security, but the very nature of such an arrangement is antithet-
ical to the traditional stallion syndicate. The whole purpose of
the stallion syndicate is to provide breeders with a necessary ser-
vice which they are free to use in their business as they see fit. Ex-
panding the role of the syndicate manager, at least within the
limits discussed in this Article, does not change the fundamental
purpose for which one purchases a stallion share.
Furthermore, no compelling policy requires a stallion share
to be classified as a security, even if the role of the syndicate man-
ager is expanded. The securities laws are designed to force disclo-
sure of material information and to provide special remedies if
such information is not disclosed. No such special disclosure re-
quirements are necessary in the case of a stallion syndicate, since
the investor has easy access to all material information. The man-
ager can check the horse's conformation and the pedigree and
performance record of the stallion are readily available. Because
these are the principal predictors of success as a breeding animal,
there is no strong need for special disclosure rules.
It is relevant to recall that in Marine Bank,' °3 the Supreme
Court refused to classify a certificate of deposit as a security, es-
sentially because the transaction did not need the special protec-
tions of the securities acts. There, the Court concluded that fed-
eral regulation and insurance coverage negated the need for the
protection of the securities legislation. In the instance of stallion
shares, one can argue that the easy availability of information
similarly eliminates the need for the protection of securities legis-
lation.
103 --U.S.--, 102 S. Ct. at 1220.
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